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THE CONTRACTING OFFICER: HIS AUTHORITY TO
ACT AND HIS DUTY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY
By CHISMAN HANES* and SHERWOOD -B. SMITH, JR.**
In the early days of the Republic government contracts were
relatively few and contracting officers, who were frequently heads
of departments, had not become a distinct class of public servants.
Armaments, munitions and ships were produced in government
arsenals and shipyards and public contracts did not constitute a
significant segment of the economy. The Civil War and World War
I, brought major, but temporary, expansions in government con-
tracting. A new build-up in public spending began under the New
Deal and the volume of government contracts during World War II
dwarfed anything previously imagined. An expanded volume has
remained with us.' Since 1940, with the proliferation and in-
creased complexity of government purchases; the law of govern-
ment contracts has grown and been refined into a unique and
specialized body of law. Government contracts are made and ad-
ministered within the framework of supervening statutes, regula-
tions, directives and decisions. Since the enactment of the Armed
Services Procurement Act 2 and the FederaI Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act,3 "contract by regulation" has received a new
and greater impetus.4  .
The contracting officer has, since Kihlberg v. United States,
5
become the center of the tension between contract by regulation
and freedom of contract. Kihlberg agreed to transport certain gov-
ernment stores and supplies from points on the Kansas Pacific
Railway to various posts in several western states. His 'contract
provided that transportation was to be paid according to distance,
"the distance to be ascertained and fixed by the chief quartermaster
of the district of New Mexico" 6 The Court held that the chief
quartermaster, in fixing the distances, "discharged a duty imposed
upon him by the mutual assent of the parties."7 . The Court, how-
ever, recognized that the provision in question was imposed by the
Government, and that Kihlberg had a -restricted freedom of con-
tract, noting that "it is not at all certain that the government would
* B.A., 1930, Duke Univ.; LL.B., 1933, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law;
member, District of Columbia.and North Carolina.Bars.
A* B.A, 1958, Williams College; LL.B., 1964, -Univ. -of Virginia; mem-
ber, District of Columbia and Virginia. Bars.. .I1. See Marcus, Studies of the Defense Contracting Process, 29 LAW
& CONTFMP. PROB. 19 (1964).
2. 62 Stat. 21-24 (1948),. as amended, 10 U.S.C,.§§ 2301-14 (1964).
3. 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended; 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1964).
4.- See Stone, Contract by Regulation, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 32
(1964).
5. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).. .
6. Id. at 400.
7. Id. at 401.
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have given its assent to any contract which did not confer upon one
of its officers the authority in question."
The contracting officer is the connecting link between statutes,
regulations and directives relating to procurement and the making
and administration of specific contracts. It is the contracting offi-
cer and his staff who have continuous and direct contact with the
government supplier. He acts not only as an agent of one of the
contracting parties, but also as an arbiter of disputes between the
parties. He daily makes decisions affecting the supplier's opera-
tions and economic health which become final. Indeed, compara-
tively few of the contracting officer's decisions are ever appealed
or reviewed by an agency appeal board or a court.
Despite the importance of the contracting officer relatively
little has been published specifically about him. This is not sur-
prising, since even though most government contract cases arise
because of an action or decision of a contracting officer, they are
usually discussed in connection with the substantive law to which
they relate and not in terms of the duties and responsibilities of
contracting officers.9 Hence, a brief review of the contracting offi-
cer's authority and responsibility appears worthwhile.
Because of the complexity, novelty and variety of purchases by
the defense agencies, modern government contract law has been
largely evolved in connection with procurement by those agencies.
This article, therefore, will give principal attention to statutes, regu-
lations and cases defining the authority and role of the contracting
officer within the Defense establishment. The principles derived
from these sources are generally applicable to other agencies.
DERIVATION AND SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER
The contracting officer acts as an agent of the United States
pursuant to delegated authority.
[The United States] being a body politic, may, within the
sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, and
through the instrumentality of the proper department to
which those powers are confided, enter into contracts not
prohibited by law, appropriate to the just exercise of those
powers.'0
The Constitution does not require that the power to contract al-
Ways be brought into operation by express legislation. Limitations
and exceptions to the general principle, however, "may arise from
the distribution of powers in our government, or from the operation
of other provisions in our Constitution and laws.""
8. Id. at 401.
9. For a recent discussion of the role and authority of contracting
officers, see McBRIDE & WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS §§ 5.10-5.80;
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE HANDBOOK No. 22, §§ 1.45-1.52, 15.14-15.17 (1964).
10. United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831).
11. 30 U.S. at 128.
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Although the power of the United States to contract is not
limited to procurement, the great bulk of government contracts
provide for procurement of supplies, services or research and de-
velopment, and the body of law relating to government contracts
and contracting officers has been largely developed in connection
with procurement. The departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment engage in procurement pursuant to specific statutory author-
ity or an implied power. 12 Some statutes authorizing procurement
give a department or agency authority which is general in nature.'
3
Others authorize the procurement of specific categories of supplies
or services, sometimes subject to stated conditions.14  Numerous
statutes prescribe conditions and clauses for government contracts
generally or for particular types of contracts. Methods and pro-
cedures for procurement are prescribed by the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act, 5 which is applicable to the military departments
within the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, and by the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act,16 which is applicable to
the other federal agencies, subject to the controlling authority of
the Administrator of General Services.1
7
The Armed Services Procurement Act has been primarily
implemented by the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) '8 and the procurement provisions of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act by the Federal Procurement Regu-
lations (FPR).19 The agencies have issued subordinate implement-
ing regulations.
Primary responsibility for procurement is in the heads of the
respective departments and agencies.2 The heads of the depart-
12. See 30 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 470, 481-82 (1915).
13. E.g., Dep't of the Army, 64 Stat. 322, 325 (1950), 10 U.S.C. § 4531
(1964); Dep't of the Navy, 61 Stat. 507 (1947), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §
5031 (1964).
14. E.g., Copyrights, patents, and designs, 67 Stat. 350 (1953), 10 U.S.C.
§ 2386 (1964); Research for Dep't of the Navy, 60 Stat. 780 (1946), 10
U.S.C. § 7522 (1964).
15. 62 Stat. 21-24 (1948), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1964).
16. 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1964).
17. 63 Stat. 379 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 630 (1964).
18. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.100-1.1405-2 (Supp. 1965). The National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration has implemented the Act by issuance of the
NASA Procurement Regulations (NASAPR) 41 C.F.R. §§ 18-1.1 - 18-54.123
(Supp. 1965).
19. 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.00-39-1.110 (Supp. 1965). ASPR and FPR pre-
scribe various provisions for all contracts or specific categories of contracts,
which are premised on statutes other than the two procedural acts, e.g.,
Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10d (1964);
Renegotiation Act, 65 Stat. 7 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211-
1233 (1964).
20. E.g., 64 Stat. 264 (1950), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 3012 (1964)
(Secretary of the Army). These procurement responsibilities are assigned
to an assistant secretary. The Secretary of Defense may assign common




ments and agencies and officials at the level of an Assistant Secre-
tary seldom execute or administer contracts. Pursuant to appli-
cable laws and regulations, officers and civilian employees at sub-
ordinate levels are appointed contracting officers for the perform-
ance of procurement functions. Aside from the general authority to
delegate given to the respective secretaries of the military depart-
ments, the Armed Services Procurement Act specifically provides
that "the head of an agency may delegate, subject to his direction,
to any other officer or official of that agency, any power" under the
Act, except the power to make certain determinations and decisions
concerning the need for negotiated procurement. 21
" Contracting officers may be appointed by an agency head or by
a subordinate official to whom the authority to appoint has been
delegated. 22 They are usually appointed by the heads of procuring
activities or other organizational entities with procurement re-
sponsibilities.
Sometimes by the certificate or letter of appointment a mone-
tary limitation is placed upon a contracting officer's authority.23
With respect to some types of contracts, award approval by higher
authority may be required.24
Within the scope of his authority, the contracting officer, or his
authorized representative, is the exclusive agent of the Government
in. the making and administration of contracts. 25 In acting as an
arbiter between the parties the contracting officer theoretically acts
pursuant to a delegation of authority from both parties under the
contract.26 The disputes clause of government contracts, 27 how-
ever, is prescribed by the Government, and thus the'acceptance of
the contracting officer as the "third party" to decide disputed qUes-
tions of fact is a prerequisite to the making of a contract with the
Government.
INHERENT LIMITATIONS UPON THE AUTHORITY OF THE
CONTRACTING OFFICER
The derivation and scope of authority of a Government official
is of particular importance because the courts and boards gener-
21. 62 Stat. 24 (1948), as amended, .10 U.S.C..§ :2311 (1964). The head
o. an agency may. also delegate functions and responsibilities in connection
.with procurement.,for another agency.. 62 Stat. 25 (1948), as amended, 10
J :S.C. § 2308 (1964).
22.., ASPR, 1405, 32 C.F.R. §. 1.405 .(Supp. 1965).
'23. ASPR' 1-405.2,. 32 C.F.R. '§ 1.405-2(a) (Supp. 1965). For small
purchases ."ordering officers" are sometimes appointed". For example, sub-
ject. to certain exceptions in the Department of the Army, an ordering
officer's authority is limited to purchases of 250 dollars or less.
24. See 32 C.F.R. § 1.403 (Supp. 1965). In the Department of the
Navy, for example, ,a business clearance by the Office of Naval Materiel
is required for large or unusual contracts.
25.. See. 32 C.F.R. § 3.801-2 (Supp. .1965).
26. Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
27. See 32 C.F.R, § 7.103-12 (Supp. 1965).
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ally hold void any exercise of authority not made in- accordance
with the official's express authority. Generally speaking,. Govern-
ment officers are agents of limited authority.28 This principle :is
well illustrated by Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill.29 A farmer
procured crop insurance from an agent of the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corporation for a crop of spring wheat that had been reseeded
in winter wheat acreage. The agent advised the farmer that the
entire crop was insurable. Neither he nor the local agent knew
that under a duly-promulgated regulation of the Corporation,
published in the Federal Register, such wheat acreage was not in-
surable. The crop was destroyed. The farmer's claim for benefits
was denied by the Government because the crop had not been in-
surable. The farmer recovered in the state court. The Supreme
Court reversed, stating:
Anyone entering into an arrangement with the Gov-
ernment takes the risk of having accurately ascertained
that he who purports to act for the Government stays with-*
in the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority
may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by dele-
gated legislation, properly exercised through the rulemak-
ing power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent
himself may have been unaware of the limitation upon his
authority.3 0
This principle has been applied even when the contracting officer
misrepresented his authority...
The principle that Government employees are agents of limited
authority has resulted in rules of agency uniquely applicable. to
Government employees.3 2 Thus, it is consistently held that the
Government can not be bound by the apparent authority of its
agents.8 3 Moreover, the Government is not estopped by the action
28. See e.g., Johnson, Drake and Piper, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9824. &
10,199, 65-2 BCA 4868 (1965).
29. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
30. Id. at 384. In Gay St. Corp v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 341
(1955), the contracting officer negotiated a 21 month lease of property.: The
applicable :agency regulations did not restrict the term for which he had
authority to lease. The court held that the Government was not obligated
for a term extending beyond the fiscal. year, in the absence of express con-
gressional authorization and available appropriation. . : :
31. Nat'l Electronics Labs., Inc.. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 308 (1960);
Prestex Inc., ASBCA No. 6572; 61-1 BCA 3937; Manhattan Lighting Equip.
Co., ASBCA'No. 6533; 61-2. BCA IT 3140 (1961).'
32. Since the specific rules applicable to Government employees, flow
from their limited authority and not from any :unusual features *of the
Goverimenm t contract itself, however, the traditional rules of agency ap-
plicable in commercial contracts govern the actions of the. contractor's em-
ployees. See Trak Electronics Co., ASBCA No. 4941, 65-2 BCA 4941;
Apemco, Inc., ASBCA No. 9952, 65-2 BCA fT 5131 (1965).
33. See.e.g., Wilber Nat'l Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120 (1934):;
Chalker & Lund Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 381 (1952); Ship Constr.
Co. V. United States, 91 Ct. Cl 419 (1940), But see George H.: Whike Constr.
Co:v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 126 (1956).
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of its agents, nor is it estopped to assert that its agents lack power
to bind the government.14 In Moran Bros., Inc. v. United States,
3 5
however, the Court recognized that the Government may waive its
rights:
Whether the basic rationale be grounded upon estoppel
or waiver, a party to a contract may generally dispense
with procedural requirements made for its benefit. This
court has recognized the authority of the government to
waive certain contract provisions, certain agency regula-
tions, and even some statutes.
Government waiver of contract requirement has been upheld in a
wide variety of circumstances. 8
In situations in which strict enforcement of the limited powers
of Government agents would work an injustice to contractors, it is
not required that the contracting officer adhere to all the details
which circumscribe the grant of authority. Thus, while the stand-
ard changes clause provides that: "the Contracting Officer may at
any time, by a written order, and without notice to sureties, make
changes,"3 7 it is generally recognized that a contract may be con-
structively changed by an oral direction or an action of the con-
tracting officer or by a direction from a subordinate which is
ratified by the contracting officer.3 8 Where the authority of the
contracting officer is limited to changes of a particular dollar
amount, however, the Board will not permit a constructive change
in excess of the amount in question.39
There are situations in which a contracting officer's authority
may be implied when it is incident to an expressly authorized statu-
tory responsibility. 40 This implied authority, however, is strictly
construed.
34. In Byrne Organization, Inc. v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 578, 587
(1961) it was held:
It is an established proposition that estoppel cannot be set up
against the Government on the basis of an unauthorized represen-
tation or act of an officer or employee who is without authority
in his individual capacity to bind the Government.
See Generally, McIntire, Authority of Government Contracting Officers:
Estoppel and Apparent Authority, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 162 (1956).
35. Ct. Cl. No. 167-63 (June 11, 1965) slip op. at p. 5.
36. See e.g., Maizel Labs, Inc., ASBCA No. 8597, 1963 BCA 3898
(1963) (waiver of non-compliance with specifications). Where the due
date of the contract and like situations are involved "election" might be a
better term than "waiver." CUNEO, GOVERNMENT CONTRAcTs HANDBOOK
121 (1962).
37. ASPR 7-103.2, 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-2 (Supp. 1965).
38. See e.g., Fox Valley Eng'r, Inc. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 228
(1960). See generally Spector, An Analysis of the Standard "'Changes"
Article, 25 FED. B.J. 177, 186 (1965).
39. See Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9824 & 10,199, 65-2
BCA 4868 (1965); Hallicrafters Co., ASBCA No. 7097, 1962 BCA 3618
(1962).
40. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe, Ry. v. Sunmerfield, 229 F.2d 777
(D.C. Cir. 1955). This is to be distinguished from the situation .in which
[Vol. 70
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THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACTING OFFICER
With the increasing complexity in the procurement process, it
is sometimes difficult for a contractor to identify the responsible
contracting officer authorized to act in a given circumstance. The
confusions which may arise from the assignment of specialized du-
ties to particular contracting officers is evident from the most
recent revision of the definition of contracting officer:
Contracting Officer means any person who, either by
virtue of his position or by appointment in accordance with
procedures prescribed by this Regulation, is currently a
contracting officer (see 1-400) with the authority to enter
into and administer contracts and make determinations and
findings with respect thereto, or with any part of such au-
thority. The term also includes the authorized representa-
tive of the contracting officer acting within the limits of
his authority. NOTE: Recent assignments of contract ad-
ministration responsibilities have necessitated a separation
of duties related to procurement, with some duties normally
performed at a purchasing office and some duties norma-
ly performed at a contract administration office. For con-
venience of expression, when requiring performance of
specific duties by a contracting officer, this Regulation may
refer to a contracting officer (PCO), and to a contracting
officer at a contract administration office as an administra-
tive contracting officer (ACO). Additionally, a contracting
officer, responsible for the settlement of terminated con-
tracts, may be referred to as the termination contracting
officer (TCO). It is recognized that a single contracting
officer may be responsible for duties in any or all of these
areas, and reference in this Regulation to PCO, ACO, or
TCO does not of itself require that duty be performed at a
particular office or activity or restrict in any way a con-
tracting office in the performance of any duty properly as-
signed. For example, a duty specified by this Regulation to
be performed by the ACO will be performed by a con-
tracting officer at the purchasing office when contract ad-
ministration or responsibility for that duty has been re-
tained in the purchasing office.41
Confusions and disputes arise not only because contractors are
not properly informed of the areas of responsibility of the several
contracting officers, but also because the PCO, ACO and TCO are
sometimes uncertain of the division of responsibility between
them.42 In Instrument Associates,43 holding that certain termina-
tion supplemental agreements did not bar claims for alleged chan-
ges in contracts, the Board said:
Prior to execution of the termination Supplemental
the Government has an implied contract right, and in which the contracting
officer presumably has express authority to enforce the implied right.
See Nikko Kensetsu Co., ASBCA Nos. 5758 & 5955, 61-1 BCA q 2888 (1960).
41. 32 C.F.R. § 1.201-3 (Supp. 1965).
42. See MCBRIDE AND WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, § 5.10(2).
43. ASBCA No. 9098, 65-1 BCA 4857 (1965).
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Agreements, the appellant informed the TCO, ACO and
PCO of his dissatisfaction in the contract areas presently
in dispute. Their areas of responsibility being unclear to
them, none of the three contracting officers inquired as to
* the appellant's desire to file a formal claim, nor did they
advise him of his right to do so despite a Government in-
tention to settle all claims and close the contracts. 44
The Board also noted that the "evidence given by Government wit-
nesses indicates the general practice in determining responsibilities
of the Various contracting officers was never really clear to them
and that it was changed on various occasions.
'45
When there are several contracting officers in a procurement
office, all of whom appear to have authority to execute contracts
and amendments, and more than one takes action with respect to a
specific contract, confusion and controversy sometimes arises. For
efficiency and fairness in the administration of contracts, it is im-
perative that the several contracting officers be clearly cognizant of
the division of responsibility between them, and the contractor be
fully advised of the authority of each officer.
EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER BY HIS
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE
If the number and kind of contracting officers is proliferating,
so also is the number and kind of inspectors, resident engineers and
other subordinate officials who often have the most direct contact
with the contractor during performance. Since ASPR defines con-
tract.ing officer to include his authorized representative, the ques-
tion ' frequently arises whether inspectors or other officers are au-
thorized representatives of the contracting officer for given pur-
poses.
When the contract specifically designates representatives of the
Government to take certain action, the statements of other subor-
dinate Government officials will not bind the Government. 46 The
rationale behind this rule has been said to be that: "[t] he Govern-
ment is too vast, its operations too varied and intricate, to put it to
the risk of losing that which it holds for the nation as a whole be-
cause of the oversight of subordinate officials.
'47
44. Id. at p. 22,987. During the termination settlement negotiations,
the contractor was advised that the claims in question were the responsi-
bility of the ACO. He was subsequently advised that responsibility for
.processing all claims had been assigned to the TCO.
45. ASBCA No. 9098, at p. 22,985.
46. Luxaire Sunbeam Heating & Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 10,300, 65-2
BCA 4971 (1965). Where a representative is designated in the contract,
and is expressly denied authority to direct changes, the contractor will
be required to confirm an alleged change order with the contracting officer.
Woodcraft Corp. v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 101 (1959); Barton & Sons
Co., ASBCA Nos. 9477 and 9764, 65-2 BCA % 4874 (1965).
47. Montana Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491, 497
(D.C. Cir. 1950) cert. denied 340'U.S. 947 (1950).
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If the contract permits an authorized representative to act for
the contracting officer, but is silent as to which Government officers
are covered by this term, and the contracting officer has not desig-
nated an authorized representative, the general rule is still.that
the acts of inspectors and other subordinates will not bind the Gov-
ernment because the officer in question has not been designated an
authorized representative. 48 This general rule is followed with suf-
ficient regularity to make seeking the confirmation of a subordi-
nate's orders the safest. contract management procedure. 49 There
.are, however, at least three5" aids to contractors who have followedthe orders of subordinates without obtaining confirmation from the
contracting officer and who seek compensation for the change or-
dered by the subordinate officer. The contractor may be able to
show that the contracting officer ratified the order of an unau-
thorized representative.5 1 The contractor must show that the con-
tracting officer actually or constructively knew of the order 52 and
either approved 53 or failed to disavow the order.
54
The contractor may alternatively be able to show inability to
seek confirmation from the contracting officer.55 Finally, it appears
that the Government has the burden of proving the lack of author-
48. Jefferson Constr. Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 75 (1960),
affirming Jefferson Constr. Co. ASBCA No. 2249, 57-1 BCA f 1330 (1957);
James McHugh Sons, Inc. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 414 (1943); Universal
:Match Corp., ASBCA No.. 4797, 59-2 BCA 2288 (1959).
49. See, e.g., Moyer Bros. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. i20, 139 (1962)
(resident engineer). In Premier Elec. Int'l Corp., FAACAP No. 65-14, 65-1
BCA 4788 (1965), the board stated:
" If the contractor proceeds to make modifications on the strength
of oral instructions from a Resident Engineer alone he takes the
risk that the Contracting Officer will not ratify the instruction.
Id. at p. 22,723. The contractor has a right to. insist upon confirmation
from the contracting officer. International. Aircraft Serv., Inc., ASBCA No.
8389, 65-1 BCA 4793 (1965).
50. Further, there are occasional broad statements in Board cases
to the effect that adherence to the strict letter of contractual provisions
.would require overlooking the realities of. particular construction situa-
tions. See, e.g., Carroll Co., ENG BCA No. 2525, 65-2 BCA 4966 (1965).
51. R. W. Borrowdale Co., ASBCA No. 9905, 65-1 BCA 4853 (1965);
Lox Equip. Co., ASBCA No. 8985, 1964 BCA 4463 (1964);.W. Southard
Jones, Inc., ASBCA No. 6321, 61-2 BCA 3182 (1961) ;, Barnes Constr. Co.,
ASBCA No. 5977, 61-2 BCA 3216 (1961). .
52. See Carroll Co., ENG BCA No. 2525, 65-2 BCA 7 4966 (1965), mo-
tion for reconsideration denied, 65-2 BCA 4997 (1965); Lox Equip. Co.,
ASBCA No. 8985, 1964 BCA 4463 (1965); Banton Constr. Co.,. ASBCA No.
.3865, 58-1 BCA 1801 (1958)...
53. Approval need not be formal or in writing. Sloan's Moving &
Storage Co., ASBCA No. 10,187, 65-1 BCA 4685 (1965).
54. Williams v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 435 (1955); Lox Equip.
Co., ASBCA No. 8985, 1964 BCA 1 4463 (1964). The Court of Claims has
held that delay of one month in disavowing the acts of unauthorized rep-
:resentatives is.not a ratification. Byrne Organization, Inc. v. United States,
.;152 Ct. Cl..578 (.1961).
55. Barton & Sons Co., ASBCA Nos. 9477 & 9764, 65-2 BCA . .4874
(1965) (epoxy would have spoiled).
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ity of a representative who acts on its behalf.56 The contractor is
aided in this regard by a rebuttable presumption "that Government
officers act within the scope of their authority. '57 Similarly,
when the subordinate has been placed at the location of perform-
ance of the contract, the Board has stated: "It would be inane in-
deed to suppose that the resident engineer was at the site for no
purpose. We believe . .. that the resident engineer was the au-
thorized representative of the contracting officer.
'58
A persistent problem in this area is the extent to which the
Government may withdraw authority from a subordinate during
performance. If the withdrawal of authority is clear, and the con-
tractor is notified of the withdrawal, he cannot later complain if he
follows any unauthorized instructions. If the withdrawal of au-
thority is not "clear cut", 59 however, or if the withdrawal is ac-
complished by an internal directive of which the contractor is not
informed,60 the Government will be bound by the acts of the sub-
ordinate officer within the scope of his former authority.
DUTY OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY
The majority of cases defining the duty of the contracting
officer to act independently have arisen as a result of a decision
under the disputes clause during the performance of a contract.
This duty, however, begins upon the initiation of the procurement
process and pertains to any determination made by the contracting
officer in the exercise of his authorized and delegated responsibili-
ties.
This principle is illustrated by Southern, Waldrip & Harvick
Co. v. United States.61 The instructions to bidders provided that
56. See e.g., Framiau Corp., IBCA No. 228, 61-2 BCA 3116 (1961).
The Government could conceivably contend, however, that since inspec-
tors have so frequently been held to be without authority to bind the
government, R & R Constr. Co., IBCA Nos. 413 & 458, 59, 64, 65-2 BCA
5109 (1965), the burden should fall on the contractor to show that an
inspector was the authorized representative of the contracting officer. See
Hammond Pool & Eng'r Co., ASBCA No. 9991, 65-1 BCA 4721 (1965).
57. Standard Store Equip. Co., ASBCA No. 4348, 58-2 BCA 1902
(1958). The Board also held that the Government may not prove lack of
authority simply by showing that the subordinate had not received a writ-
ten delegation from the contracting officer.
58. Lillard's, ASBCA No. 6630, 61-1 BCA 3053 (1961) quoting Gen-
eral Cas. Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 520, 533 (1955). See also Clevite
Ordnance, Div. of Clevite Corp., ASBCA No. 5859, 1962 BCA 3330 (1962)
(project engineer); Swimerton & Walberg, ASBCA No. 3144, 56-2 BCA
1038 (1956) (resident engineer).
59. Wilkins Co., FAACAP No. 66-13, 65-2 BCA 5242 (1965).
60. Wickes Eng'r & Constr. Co., IBCA No. 191, 61-1 BCA 2872
(1961), on motion for reconsideration, 61-1 BCA 2915 (1961); Martin Co.,
ASBCA No. 4381, 60-1 BCA 2509 (1960). Cf., Cramp Shipbldg. Co. v.
United States, 122 Ct.Cl. 72, 98 (1952). Where the contract designates the
authorized representatives, a change in designation would seem to require
a contract change.
61. 334 F.2d 245 (Ct.Cl. 1964).
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questions concerning timely receipt of a bid modification would be
decided by the officer awarding the contract. The plaintiff filed
a telegraphic bid modification which the contracting officer ac-
cepted as timely. The plaintiff's bid, as modified, was the low bid.
The next lowest bidder protested that the modification was not
timely. After reviewing the facts concerning the filing and receipt
of the modification, the contracting officer sent to the Chief of
Engineers, his finding that the modification was filed in sufficient
time and should be accepted. The Chief of Engineers determined
that the bid modification was dispatched too late to be considered
and that the amount of the contract should be the original amount
bid. After protest by the plaintiff, a contract was entered into with
the contracting officer for the original amount, reserving to the
plaintiff the right to seek recovery of the additional modified sum.
62
The Court of Claims held that the provision in the instructions to
bidders that the contracting officer should determine timeliness of
the modification was in effect
an agreement between the Government and prospective
contractors, and agreements such as this which designate a
particular Government official to make a certain factual de-
termination must be strictly observed.
6 3
The court also concluded "that the Chief of Engineers acted with-
out authority in making an independent determination as to the
timeliness of plaintiff's bid modification and in reversing the finding
of the contracting officer.
'64
THE DIsPuTEs CLAUSE
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation prescribes a
standard disputes clause for inclusion in contracts. This clause makes
the contracting officer the agent of both parties for the settlement of
disputes under the contract. 65 He must, of course, act within the
limits of his authority under statute and regulation, but his duties
and responsibilities as arbiter come from the contract itself and
from the quasi-judicial functions of his position. The Interior
Board has said:
When a contracting officer makes a decision under
[the Disputes] article, he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity,
62. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals had dismissed an
appeal by the plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction holding that the dispute was
not appealable under the disputes clause because it had arisen before the
contract was executed.
63. 334 F.2d at 249.
64. Id. at 250. See also Sperry Gyroscope Co., ASBCA No. 9700, 1964
BCA 4514 (1964).
65. The role of the contracting officer in this regard has been de-
scribed as that of an "impartial third party expert." Int'l Builders of
Florida, Inc., FAACAP No. 65-22, 65-1 BCA 4856 (1965) at p. 22, 982.
For a general history of the role of the contracting officer as arbiter and
the growth of departmental appellate bodies, see Shedd, Disputes and
Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 39 (1964).
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and is bound to observe a high standard of impartiality,
whereas an officer who is merely making a recommenda-
tion or referral to another is ordinarily free to assume the
role of an advocate.
66
Perhaps because the contracting officer's function in deciding
disputes is quasi-judicial, neither the general provisions of ASPR
nor the disputes clause itself have traditionally been specific in
defining his duties and responsibilities in deciding disputes. In this
regard the standard disputes clause states only:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any
dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this
contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be de-
cided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his deci-
sion to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy there-
of to the Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Offi-
cer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from
the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or
otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written
appeal addressed to the Secretary.
6 7
This clause does not define a "dispute concerning a question of
fact," but the word "dispute" connotes that the parties must have
taken adversary positions with regard to an issue before the con-
tracting officer renders a decision. The contracting officer may not
suddenly impose a "decision" on a given matter upon a contractor
when the contractor does not at that time have sufficient knowl-
edge of what his own position will be to take a firm stand. 68 Thus,
66. Gila Constr. Co., IBCA No. 79, 56-2 BCA 1074 at p. 2618 (1956).
67. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-2 (Supp. 1965) (Fixed-price supply contracts).
A similar clause is prescribed for other types of contracts. The first sen-
tence of the disputes clause recognizes that disputes arising in the admin-
istration of a contract may be settled by agreement. Actually, most ques-
tions which do arise are settled by agreement without a decision by the
contracting officer as arbiter. Agreements thus reached, in the absence
of fraud or other special circumstances, are final. Continental Aviation &
Eng'r Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9894 & 9938, 65-1 BCA 4460 (1965) (agree-
ment on overhead rates).
68. Eastern Realty & Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 9473, 1963 BCA 7 3964
(1963); see Charles H. Riddle Co., ASBCA No. 1441, 65-2 BCA 5090
(1965), where the contracting officer ordered extra work and included in
the order a statement that the order was a final decision under the dis-
putes clause. The board held that the decision was not in fact a decision
under the disputes clause since there was no dispute prior to the "deci-
sion." See also Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., ASBCA No. 2568, 56-2 BCA
1011 at p. 2080 (1956), where an informal submission of a claim by the
contractor was held not to entitle the contracting officer to make a final
decision under the disputes clause.
While a decision to terminate a contract for default is appealable
under the disputes clause, 32 C.F.R. § 8.602-3(d) & (g) (Supp. 1965), the
authority to terminate for default comes from the termination article, not
the disputes clause, Park Moving & Storage Co., ASBCA No. 7798, 1962
BCA 3469 (1962), and therefore the extent to which the contracting
officer must alert the contractor to the likelihood of default and give the
contractor the opportunity to dispute the issue is controlled by the termi-
nation article.
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if a contracting officer terminates a contract for default and at the
same time assesses a specific amount of excess costs, the decision as
to-the excess costs is not final if no dispute exists at that point con-
cerning the excess costs.6 9
THE CONTRACTING OFFICER's DECISION
The contracting officer is continuously rendering advice and
making statements concerning situations that arise during perform-
ance. Hence, it has not always been clear what is a final decision
which must be appealed within thirty days.70 A 1960 amendment
to ASPR,71 however, which prescribed certain rules designed to
make final decisions more readily identifiable, has put to rest some
troublesome questions that existed prior to its issuance. The
requisites of a "final decision" have been elaborated in the cases,
and contractors should be alert to the Board decisions in this area.
The contracting officer must reduce his decision to writing.
72
The decision must be labeled as a "final decision," 73 and it must
69. See Eastern Realty & Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 9473, 1963 BCA
3964 (1963). March Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 9473, 1963 BCA 3940
(1963); Swivels, Ltd., ASBCA No. 8947, 1963 BCA 3964 (1963).
70. See, e.g., Tetyak-Young Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 2971, 56-2 BCA
1053. (1956), where a letter not identified as a final decision under the
disputes clause was nevertheless held to be final "since it unequivocally
denied appellant's claim and since it precisely set forth the reasons there-
fore." Id. at p. 2489.
•71. 32 C.F.R. § 1.314 (Supp. 1965). It has been said, however, that
the decision need only be in "substantial" conformity with the require-
ments of ASPR 1-314. German Land & Timber Co., ASBCA No. 9413.
1963 BCA 3953 (1963) (dictum). For a discussion of the effect of AFPI
requirements before incorporation in ASPR 1-314, see Bostwick-Batterson
Co. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 560 (1960); Keystone Coat & Apron Mfg.
Corp. v. United States, 150 Ct.Cl. 277 (1960); Frank Gust Decorating Serv.,
ASBCA No. 7198, 61-2 BCA 3200 (1961).
72. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (Supp. 1965) (ASPR Disputes clause). But
see Bay Hardware, ASBCA No. 7119, 61-2 BCA 3114 (1961), where the
contractor appealed from an oral decision which was clear, and the failure
to put it in writing was attributable to the officer.
73. ASPR 1-314(d), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965), amending 32 C.F.R.
§ 1.314 (Supp. 1965), United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 BCA
3701 (1963) (a contracting officer's decision must state that it is such);
Brown Foundry & Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 9172, 1963 BCA 4008 (1963).
In Edisto Constr. Co., IBCA No. 409, 1963 BCA 4120, the Interior Board
held that it was not sufficient that a separate transmittal letter described
the decision as "Findings of Fact." In an unusual decision, Warren Paint-
ing Co., ASBCA No. 6511, 61-2 BCA 3199 (1961), a contracting officer's
letter was held to be final, although the letter did not state that it itself
was a decision, but rather that an earlier unclear letter was. The letter
did address itself to the merits making plain that the denial of -the claim
was final. Since the wording of the letter is not set forth by the Board,
-the opinion is difficult to evaluate, contra, Charles H. Riddle Co., ASBCA
No. 1441, 65-2 BCA 5090 (1965). See also Sheridan-Murray, ASBCA No.
7615, 1962 BCA 3604 (1962); Hugh H. Edy Co., ASBCA No. 5039, 1962
BCA 3379 (1962); Sherry-Richards Co., ASBCA No. 6965, 61-2 BCA
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refer to the disputes clause.7 4 The decision should advise the con-
tractor of his right of appeal, the procedures for making an appeal,
and the time limit in which an appeal must be filed.75 Finally, the
decision must be signed by the contracting officer,76 although he
need not sign in his capacity as contracting officer.
77
The contracting officer must include in the decision a statement
of facts sufficient to enable the contractor to understand both the
decision and the basis for it. 7 s Normally, all issues in the con-
3167 (1961). A decision not described as a final decision under the Dis-
putes clause was nevertheless upheld in MacDonald Constr. Co., IBCA
No. 411, 65-1 BCA 4750 (1965), where the contracting officer included
the whole Disputes clause in a letter which was final in tone.
74. United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 BCA 3701 (1963);
Brown Foundry & Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 9172, 1963 BCA 4008 (1963);
Production Tool Corp., IBCA No. 262, 61-1 BCA 3007 (1961); Barkley
Pipeline Constr. Co., IBCA No. 264, 61-1 BCA 3006 (1961); Central
Wrecking Corp., IBCA No. 69, 57-1 BCA 1209 (1957).
75. ASPR 1-314(d), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965), amending 32 C.F.R. §
1.314 (Supp. 1965). United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 BCA
3701 (1963); Production Tool Corp., IBCA No. 262, 61-1 BCA % 3007
(1961). In Curtiss Wright Corp., ASBCA No. 4103, 60-2 BCA 2790 (1960),
the decision was responsive to contractors statement of position and made
findings of fact that appeared to affect the legal position of the parties,
but failed to include the usual cautionary language that the contractor had
the right to appeal the decision under the disputes clause. The board
rejected the Government's position that the appeal was premature stating:
The omission of the usual cautionary paragraph from the decision
did not in this case deprive the appellant of any right. We need
not regard the inclusion of such language to be essential to an
appealable decision.
Id. at pp. 14303-304.
76. Franklin Clothes, Inc., ASBCA No. 4302, 58-2 BCA 1957 (1958).
A decision has been held valid when signed by one contracting officer for
another who had gone on leave without signing his decision. Global Van
Lines, ASBCA No. 5714, 60-1 BCA 2498 (1960).
77. See American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d
577 (Ct.Cl. 1965). The contracting officer made a decision to terminate
the contract and signed his name followed by the title "Chief, Household
Furnishings Section, National Buying Division." The court held this suffi-
cient since the contractor knew the contracting officer by name.
If, however, there is substantial question whether a written statement
by the contracting officer was meant to be a final decision, the fact that
the contracting officer signed the statement in some other capacity has
been considered relevant. See Radio Corp. of America, ASBCA No. 6733,
1962 BCA 3466 (1962); Blaw-Knox Co., ASBCA No. 3761, 57-1 BCA
1226 (1957).
78. ASPR 1-314(b), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965), amending 32 C.F.R.
§ 1-314 (Supp. 1965). River Assoc. Inc. CGBCA No. T-166, 65-2 BCA
5039 (1965). See Spaw Glass, Inc., IBCA No. 281, 61-2 BCA 3185 (1961);
Production Tool Corp., IBCA No. 262, 61-1 BCA 3007 (1961). In Germane
Land and Timber Co., ASBCA No. 9413, 1963 BCA 3953 (1963), the con-
tracting officer's letter stated that it was a final decision, but failed to
state what had been decided. The Board held that the decision lacked the
finality requisite for appeal. For the rule as to necessity of making find-




troversy should be decided at the same time.79 Moreover, the
decision must be responsive to the issues involved, and a decision
that fails to address itself to the dispute or purports to decide is-
sues not in dispute is not a final decision under the disputes
clause.80
Despite these formal requirements for a contracting officer's
final decision, contracting officers still sometimes issue ambiguous
communications which do not comply with the requirements but
which imply a determination concerning the rights of a contractor.
While a decision which does not comply with the requirements of
the regulations does not become final and binding upon the
contractor,8 1 where the contractor has elected to appeal under the
disputes clause, the appeal board has in a number of cases accepted
jurisdiction.
82
Since the formal requirements for a final decision are primarily
for the protection of the contractor, where the contractor elects to
appeal from a defective decision, acceptance of jurisdiction by the
Board would, in most cases, seem appropriate. If the matter in dis-
pute is defined, and can be determined by the Board, the contractor
should not be subjected to the delay of a remand to the contracting
officer.8 3
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER
The standard disputes clause does not describe the contracting
79. ASPR 1-314(c), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965), amending 32 C.F.R.
§ 1.314 (Supp. 1965); but failure to decide all the issues in dispute will
apparently not make a decision as to some issues invalid. See Markowitz
Bros. Inc., GSBCA No. 1001, 65-1 BCA 4659 (1965).
80. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., ASBCA No. 10886, 65-2 BCA 1 5151 (1965):
In the instant case a decision has been rendered but it 'decides' a
question that was not in dispute . . . and it includes no decision
on the question that is in dispute .... Thus no appealable deci-
sion on the matter in dispute has yet been rendered.
Id. at pp. 24, 248. See also J. E. Peters, Inc., ASBCA No. 4198, 57-2 BCA
1375 (1957); General Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 2458, 56-2 BCA 1093 (1956).
It has been held that a contracting officer's failure or refusal to decide a
dispute is itself an appealable decision. See e.g. Penker Constr. Co. v.
United States, 96 Ct.Cl. 1 (1942); Wood of Texas Indus., ASBCA No. 5697,
59-2 BCA 2464 (1959).
When the contractor has failed to appeal within the allotted time he
may not again request a decision on the merits and appeal from the
"refusal" to decide the issue. Keystone Coat & Apron Mfg. Corp., ASBCA
No. 3236, 56-2 BCA 1051 (1956); Camel Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 3454, 3455,
56-2 BCA 1021 (1956).
81. Bostwick-Batterson Co. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 560 (1960).
82. E.g., United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 BCA 3975
(1963); Tavco Inc., ASBCA No. 10025, 65-1 BCA 4537 (1965). But see
Artisan Electronics Corp., ASBCA No. 9,122, 1963 BCA 3975 (1963);
McLinn Constr. Co., IBCA No. 369, 1963 BCA 3798 (1963).
83. There is, however, a risk that acceptance of jurisdiction without




officer's decision-making process. A section in the General Pro-
visions of ASPR, 4 however, provides that before making a decision
the contracting officer must review the available facts pertinent to
a dispute,8 5 obtain any required advice and assistance from legal
and other advisers, and consider the necessity for coordination with
the contract administration office or purchasing office. The ulti-
mate decision, however, must be that of the contracting officer.8 6
An obvious instance in which the contracting officer fails in
his responsibility to render the decision himself is when he asks the
Comptroller General to render a decision for him.
8 7
The Supreme Court early decided that the Comptroller of the
Treasury, predecessor in interest to the Comptroller General, lacked
power to disturb a finding of the contracting officer when the
contract provided that his decision should govern a particular dis-
pute.8 8 Moreover, when the contracting officer has not rendered a
decision but instead has referred the dispute to the Comptroller
General, the Court of Claims has affirmed the duty of the contract-
ing officer to make the decision himself.8 9 The same principle has
84. ASPR 1-314(a), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965) amending 32 C.F.R. §
1-314 (Supp. 1965).
85. The requirement that the deciding officer must review the avail-
able facts before rendering a decision existed prior to the 1960 amendment
to ASPR. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (he who decides
must hear), cited with approval as to contracting officers in Climatic
Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 Ct.Cl. 520 (1950). See also Henry
Ericsson Co. v. United States, 104 Ct.Cl. 397 (1945); Penker Constr. Co. v.
United States, 96 Ct.Cl. 1 (1942).
It has been held that the contracting officer need not conduct a formal
hearing or otherwise create a record sufficient for the Board of Contract
Appeals to analyze his decision in depth. Malan Constr. Co. v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd 318 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1963).
86. ASPR 1-314(a), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965) amending 32 C.F.R.
§ 1-314 (Supp. 1965).
87. The frequent inclination of contracting officers to seek the views
of the Comptroller General is understandable but inconsistent with their
positions as arbiters. Under the Budget and Accounting Act, 42 Stat. 24
(1921), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §§ 71-134 (1964), the Comptroller General
has power to take exception to the accounts of disbursing officers and
theoretically could hold them personally liable for those disbursements
the Comptroller deems unauthorized. Actually, however, this authority
has seldom been exercised in recent years. See generally, Shnitzer, Chang-
ing Concepts in Government Procurement-The Role and Influence of the
Comptroller General on Contracting Officer's Operations, 23 Fmn. B.J. 90
.(1963).
88. United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922); accord,
United States v. Northeastern Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 326 (1922); Albina
Marine Iron Works, Inc. v. United States, 79 Ct.Cl. 714 (1934). This is
not to say that the Comptroller General cannot overrule a decision of the
contracting officer if the contractor appeals the decision to the General
Accounting Office.
89. United States Cas. Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 950 (1946);
Archibald E. Livingston, 101 Ct.Cl. 625 (1944); McHugh Sons Inc. v. United
States, 99 Ct.Cl. 625 (1944); H.W. Zweig Co. v. United States, 92 Ct.Cl. 472
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been applied when the Comptroller General has exerted pressure
on procurement officials to take a certain position, in conflict with
a prior position, within their contractual responsibility."0
The recent decision in John Reiner & Co.9' is difficult to recon-
cile with other decisions of the Court of Claims.92 After a contract
had been entered into with Reiner, the Comptroller General, upon
protest of another bidder, held that the award was improper and
that the contract should be cancelled. When the Comptroller Gen-
eral refused to change his decision, the contracting officer ter-
minated the contract, even though he did not agree with the deci-
sion. In the termination notice, he made no reference to the ter-
mination-for-convenience article. Reiner sued for breach of con-
tract. The court held that the award to Reiner was lawful, but the
action of the contracting officer was a valid termination for con-
venience. Reiner was allowed to recover on a termination for con-
venience basis, but not for breach. The court reasoned that the
contracting officer could independently terminate the contract for
convenience out of respect for the Comptroller General's views as
to proper bid procedures even though he did not agree with these
views. The court said:
It would be entirely justifiable for the contracting officer
to follow the general policy of acceding to the views of the
Accounting Office in this area even though he had another
position on the particular issue of legality or propriety. He
would not be allowing the Comptroller General to dictate
the termination of the contract but, rather, would be using
termination as a means of minimizing a conflict with an-
other arm of Government properly concerned with the con-
tractual problem. It cannot be contrary to 'the best inter-
est of the Government'-the controlling standard of the ter-
mination clause-to end a contract which the Comptroller
General has branded as incorrectly advertised.
93
The court's conclusion is difficult to justify because of its recogni-
tion that the contracting officer did not in fact resort to the con-
(1941). Accord, Central Watch Serv., VACAB No. 502, 65-1 BCA f 4786
(1965); DeLong Eng'r. & Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 3396, 56-2 BCA 1110
(1956).
90. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999
(E.D. Pa. 1951); Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D.
Cal. 1950); John H. Mathis Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 703 (D.N.J.
1948); Bell Aircraft Corp., WDBCA No. 914, 3 CCF 4684 (1945).
91. 163 Ct.CI. 381 (1963).
92. See 163 Ct.Cl. at 396 (dissenting opinion of Whitaker, J.).
93. 163 Ct.Cl. at 390-91. It has been held that when the contracting
officer does not purport to exercise his contractual authority to terminate,
but merely declares that the contract has been voided by the Comptroller
General, he has not rendered a decision appealable to the Board. Stand-
ard Steel Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 8785, 1963 BCA 3704. See also
Prestex, Inc. ASBCA No. 6572 61-1 BCA g 2937; Model Eng'r. & Mfg., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 7079, 61-2 BCA 3131. But see Burroughs Corp., ASBCA No.
10065, 65-2 BCA 5086 (1965).
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venience procedure in terminating the contract or determine that
the termination was for the best interests of the Government. He
terminated a valid contract because of a decision of the Comptroller
General with which he did not agree. The court's decision appears
to have been influenced by its desire to encourage uniform bid
procedures and at the same time to provide compensation to Reiner.
The contracting officer may not abdicate his responsibilities
to his superiors, his subordinates or others in his agency.
In a recent case, after noting that findings of fact and a decision
may be made by a contracting officer or his authorized representa-
tive, the Interior Board, aptly observed:
In either event, they must represent the judgment of the
official who makes them, rather than a determination dic-
tated to him by another not authorized by the terms of the
contract. The observance of these precepts is necessary,
since the contracting officer in making a decision acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity and is bound to observe a high
standard of impartiality.
94
It is firmly established that a contracting officer may not, upon
the advice or direction of a superior, render a decision which does
not constitute an exercise of his own judgment or which is not in
accord with his judgment. 95 Also, neither under the terms of the
disputes clause or under the cases does a superior have authority
to overrule a decision of a contracting officer. 6
The contracting officer may, of course, avail himself of re-
quired advice and assistance from legal and other advisers and must
consider the necessity for coordination with related offices. 97 The
mere fact that a contracting officer refers a contractor's claim to
another office for its opinion does not of itself establish that he has
not exercised an independent judgment.98 The contracting officer
may not let a subordinate or advisory officer make or dictate a deci-
sion for him.99 It has been so held, without further analysis,
when the decision was either signed by such other officer10 0 or
94. Earl B. Bates Nursery, IBCA No. 368, 1963 BCA 3738 at pp. 18,
666 (1963).
95. So. Waldrip & Harvick Co. v. United States, 334 F.2d 245 (Ct.Cl.
1964); John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct.Cl. 645
(1955); Standard Dredging Co. v. United States, 71 Ct.Cl. 218 (1930); Elm
Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 9597, 65-2 BCA 4990 (1965).
96. See Sperry Gyroscope Co., ASBCA No. 9700, 1964 BCA 4514
(1964). See generally, McBRIDE & WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, §
5.80(3).
97. ASPR 1-314(a), 30 Fed. Reg. 14071 (1965), amending 32 C.F.R. §
1.314 (Supp. 1965).
98. Barringer & Botke, IBCA No. 428-3-64, 65-1 BCA 4797 (1965).
99. See John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct.C1.
645 (1955).
100. See e.g., Herman Adams, ASBCA Nos. 5321 & 5507, 59-2 BCA
2454 (1959) (purported decision signed by legal advisor).
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stated the opinion of another officer or officers.' 0 ' Both the con-
tractor and the Government acquire vested rights in a contracting
officer's decision which cannot be divested or waived by a successor
contracting officer.
10 2
A contractor may by its conduct waive its claim to a decision
by the contracting office administering its contract. For example,
in Kilgore v. United States,0 3 the Court of Claims upheld a deci-
sion by a superior of the contracting officer because the contractor
had dealt with the superior on performance matters and had failed
to object to the authority of the superior when his decision was
rendered. Moreover, when a contract defines "contracting officer"
in terms of a specific administrative position, a contractor has been
held to waive his right to a decision by the person holding that
position when he enters into a contract with a subordinate con-
tracting officer.
04
Because more than one individual may be comprehended in the
ASPR 10 5 and contract definitions of contracting officer, and be-
cause of the tendency of the agencies to divide responsibilities be-
tween contracting officers on a functional basis, contractors are fre-
quently confused as to the authority of a particular contracting
officer. In Caddo Business Mach. 06 the contract defined "Con-
tracting Officer" as "the person executing this contract on behalf of
the Government, and any other officer or civilian employee who is
a properly designated contracting officer." The contracting office,
however, who executed and administered the contract, did not un-
der Air Force regulations have authority to terminate the contract
for default. After the contractor failed to make delivery, the
contract was terminated for default by a Termination Contracting
Officer at another base. His processing consisted of an office re-
view of the complete contract file, from which he satisfied himself
that the contractor's failure to deliver was not due to excusable
causes. He apparently had no other connection with the contract or
the contractor. The Board upheld his action. While under the
terms of the relevant contract and regulations, the Board's action
appears to be technically correct, Caddo demonstrates that a con-
tractor's business may be disrupted without his having been heard
by the officer making the decision, or even knowing who the au-
thoritative officer is until action has been taken.
101. Holverson v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Wash. 1954).
See also Earl B. Bates Nursery, IBCA No. 368, 1963 BCA 3738 (1963);
Graham Co., ASBCA No. 4585, 58-2 BCA 1 1998 (1958).
102. P.L.S. Coat & Suit Corp., ASBCA No. 3889, 57-1 BCA 1 1239
(1957); Marmon-Harrington Co., ASBCA No. 3116, 56-2 BCA 1046 (1956).
See also Arborio, Inc. v. United States, 110 Ct.Cl. 432 (1963); American
Constr. Co., GSBCA No. 1375, 65-1 BCA 4828 (1965).
103. 121 Ct.Cl. 340 (1952).
104. Sun Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 76 Ct.Cl. 154 (1932).
105. 32 C.F.R. 1.201-3 (Supp. 1965).
106. ASBCA No. 7952, 1962 BCA 1 3450 (1962).
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It has been held that a contractor may not object to the transfer
of the administration of his contract from one Ordnance District to
another.10 7 For obvious administrative reasons this has to be so,
but the contractor should be immediately advised of the new con-
tracting officer who has responsibility for making decisions under
his contract.
FINALITY OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER'S DECISION IN THE
ABSENCE OF APPEAL
By the terms of the disputes clause, 0 8 decisions of the contract-
ing officer on questions of fact'0 9 are made final in the absence of
appeal. Moreover, since its decision in Kihlberg v. United
States,110 the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the finality
provisions of disputes clauses.' In order for a decision to become
final, however, it must be the decision of the person designated by
the disputes clause to make it, and it must be made in accordance
with the procedural requirements of the contract and the appli-
cable regulations." 2 An unappealed contracting officer's decision
is final and conclusive as to the Government, as well as the con-
tractor.113
Much has been written on the difficulty of separating questions
of fact from questions of law.114 Unless it is clear beyond doubt
that only a question of law has emerged from a contracting officer's
decision, the prudent contractor should exhaust his administrative
remedies under the disputes clause. It should also be noted that
the negative standards of Section 1 of the Wunderlich Act 15 do
not apply to contracting officers. The framers of the Act apparently
felt that it was unnecessary to make these standards applicable to
decisions of a contracting officer, because a contractor can deprive
such decisions of any finality by simply appealing them.1 6
107. Thermo Nuclear Wire Indus., ASBCA No. 6026, 61-1 (BCA)
2889 (1961).
108. ASPR 7-103.12, 32 C.F.R. 7.103-12 (Supp. 1965).
109. Wunderlich Act § 2, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1964)
provides that "[n]o Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, rep-
resentative, or board."
110. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
111. See e.g., United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944).
112. Climactic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 Ct.Cl. 520 (1950).
113. United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922).
114. See e.g., Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Juris-
diction of ASBCA, 19 FED. B.J. 120 (1959).
115. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964). Provision is made for
judicial review of an administrative decision which is "fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."
116. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board




In 1955, the Second Hoover Commission recommended that De-
partment of Defense policies should be established "to strengthen
the role of contracting officers in the interest of more expeditious
and effective buying." This recommendation was premised upon
the following commentary:
Efficiency of the contracting function in all of the mili-
tary departments can be substantially improved by
strengthening the authority of contracting officers. Effi-
cient buying demands good buyers and good buyers must
have authority commensurate with their responsibilities.
Because the authority of military buyers is limited and di-
luted, delays, overstaffing, and uncertainties to both gov-
ernment and industry result.
Laws, regulations, administrative practices, and for-
mula rules contract the area for individual thinking, and
mistakes and exceptional cases are occasions for generating
encroachments on the proper exercise of a contracting offi-
cer's free judgment. Paralleling inadequate confidence
in the contracting officer is inadequate recognition of his
human fallibility: he is somehow not allowed his share of
mistakes as others are in their everyday life of decisions.
His initiative is weakened by fears of criticism from his
own agency, the General Accounting Office, and Members
of Congress.
The justification of legal and administrative safeguards
is stated in terms of protecting public funds. The emphasis
is upon avoiding bad deals, rather than making good ones.
Good judgment is impaired and pride of job accomplish-
ment is limited. Second guessing is invited."
7
In spite of these recommendations there is a continuing pro-
liferation of regulations circumscribing both contracting officers
and contractors. Contracting officers are still sometimes second-
guessed by their superiors and the General Accounting Office." 8
The independence and responsibility of the contracting officer, how-
ever, has been established by the cases and recognized in the regu-
lations.
Recent revisions of ASPR recognize that the contracting officer
is a procurement specialist, supported by a team of professional
and functional specialists., who is competent to represent the Gov-
ernment and to protect its interests in the negotiation and adminis-
tration of contracts. In word at least, initiative and innovation by
contracting officers has been encouraged, and his personal respon-
117. TASK FORCE ON PROCUREMENT OF THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT 67 (June 1955).
S,118. Increased respect by -the GAO for actions on behalf of the gov-
ernment would result in increased efficiency in the procurement process.
Some feel that as a result of congressional .concern this is being achieved..
See FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORT No. 93, A-10 (Nov. 29, 1965).
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sibility has been made explicit. 1 9
While the independence and responsibility of the contracting
officer have been established in theory, the recent trend toward
fragmentation of his duties between procuring, administration and
termination specialists, has diffused responsibility and militated
against truly independent action by any one contracting officer.
The rationale of the disputes clause is that it provides for inde-
pendent decisions on questions arising under a contract by an in-
dividual who has expert and personal knowledge of the problems
arising in the performance of the contract. This rationale is no
longer valid when, as in Caddo Business Mach., 20 a contract is ter-
minated by a contracting officer who may be a specialist in termina-
tions, but who has no knowledge of the contract and its performance
other than that which he acquires from the perusal of a file.
Specialization in the procurement process is no doubt required
for efficiency, but it should be practiced by the contracting officer's
subordinates. The contracting officer himself should have an in-
formed and comprehensive knowledge of the total administration of
the contract which would enable him to deal fairly with the inter-
related problems which arise. Also, the contractor should be as-
sured that there is one responsible individual known to him with
whom he can deal on any problem which arises.
If the contracting officer is to act independently and respon-
sibly he must also act fairly. As contracts have been increasingly
used by the Government for the attainment of social and-economic
ends not directly related to the acquisition of supplies and as the
volume of contracting officers': decisions has multiplied, increasing
concern has been felt for the essential fairness of his decisional
process. Basic concepts of administrative law can and should be
imported into the procurement process at the contracting officer's
level, as well as in rule-making and in reviews by the appeal boards.
Before a contracting officer takes action with serious conse-
quences to the contractor, he should make certain that the con-
tractor has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. At least
a memorandum record of any ensuing conference should be made
and, a copy should be furnished to the contractor. The contracting
officer's decision should be premised not only on findings of fact,
119. E.g., ASPR 1-109.1, 32 C.F.R. § 1.109-1 (Supp. 1965)_ states that
ASPR is not intended to stifle the development of new techniques
or methods of procurement. Innovations to attain desirable objec-
tives will occasionally necessitate deviations from ASPR, and it is
the responsibility of contracting officers to request such deviations
whenever they are required in the best interest of the Government.
ASPR 3-801.2, 32 C.F.R. § 3.801-2 (Supp. 1965) admonishes the contracting
officer to avail himself of the advice of his team of specialists, but is
explicit concerning the ultimate responsibility of the contracting officer
for the making and administration of contracts; ASPR 1-314, 30 Fed. Reg.
14071 (1965) amending 32 C.F.R. § 1.314 (Supp. 1965) is equally explicit
as to his personal and exclusive responsibility.
120. ASBCA No. 7952, 1962 BCA 3450 (1962).
[Vol. 70
THE CONTRACTING OFFICER
but also on a statement of the considerations which led him to the
decision.12  Such a procedure would minimize impulsive or intui-
tive action by the contracting officer and motivate him to act with
reasoned deliberation.
The availability of complete administrative review of a con-
tracting officer's decision may sometimes tempt the contracting of-
ficer to follow subnormal procedures in the processing of a dispute
and to give less than his best attention to his decision. Unless his
actions are fully responsible, great harm can result. Contracting
officers' decisions are numerous and only a minute fraction of them
are ever appealed. For most Government contractors the contract-
ing officer is the only arbiter. Only when the contracting officer,
who is the central figure in the procurement process, acts inde-
pendently, responsibly and fairly, can both the Government and the
contractor achieve economy and efficiency.
121. See Leventhal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52
A.B.A.J. 35 (1966), wherein it is suggested that termination orders should
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